Option models can provide not only the value of an insurance policy, but also more disaggregated information concerning those precise circumstances under which defaults occur and, hence, insurance payouts must be made. The value of the insurance policy serves as a summary statistic describing insurance payouts. However, given the rather highly irregular and skewed character of the entire distribution of insurance payouts, this single value will be a poor estimate of the typical payout. Thus it should be of considerable interest to mortgage insurance issuers to know not only the expected cost of insurance, but also the entire distribution of potential payouts as exhibited in this study. Insurers have not traditionally differentiated prices among different homeowners' mortgage insurance policies as much as rational pricing or even common sense would seem to demand. The option model pricing techniques presented in this study provide the means of assessing differential mortgage insurance values.
INTRODUCTION
Mortgage insurance is triggered by default on the underlying loan. If mortgages can be treated like other financial assets, then the appropriate way to value such credit risk, and hence the value of private mortgage insurance, is like other financial assets, through option-pricing models. Indeed, although prepayment may occur for extraneous reasons, such as job reassignment or change in family structure, it is the very availability of the prepayment option that makes it unlikely that default will occur for any reason other than that the cost of the mortgage now exceeds the fallen value of the borrower's property. It is, however, exactly this sort of financial decision for which option models are ideally suited.
Although all of this is by now widely known, what is less recognized is that option models provide not only the value of an insurance policy but also more disaggre-gated information concerning those precise circumstances under which defaults occur and, hence, insurance payouts need to be made. Indeed, the value of insurance is just the expected discounted value of all such payouts, and so their occurrences must be projected by any options model.
As a sort of average of all possible insurance payouts, weighted by their likelihoods, the value of insurance does serve as a summary statistic describing insurance payouts. Default, though, is a relatively rare event, and so this average seriously underestimates the typical payout, conditional on default actually occurring. Moreover, any such mean, conditional on default or not, yields a rather poor description of the entire distribution of insurance payouts, given the latter's highly irregular and skewed character. Borrowers always act to minimize a mortgage's cost, and, thus, the value of a mortgage has the regularity characteristics of any optimized objective. On the other hand, insurance payouts have no direct effect on the borrower and so will not be considered in making prepayment or default decisions. This permits the payout to insurance to vary in a highly irregular fashion over different environments. Further, it is in the nature of insurance, as a residual for risk, to reflect and thus magnify the more extreme variations in house prices and the term structure. Although it is true that the cap on insurance payouts serves to limit such variation, as will be seen, this upper bound only serves to create a marked skew in the distribution of payouts.
Given all the complexity suggested, it should be of considerable interest for the issuer of private mortgage insurance to know not only the expected cost of insurance, but also entire distributions of potential payouts, as exhibited in this study. Although insurers could in principle diversify their risks to the point at which only mean values were of consequence, there is abundant evidence that insurers continue, instead, to bear significant risk in the form of portfolios of highly correlated policies from particular regions. In such cases, then, the entire risk distribution of insurance payouts needs to be examined.
The next section develops the model used to generate distributions of mortgage insurance liabilities, whereas the third section represents numerical results generated by the model across different types of mortgages and economic environments.
THE MODEL
To describe mortgage insurance, one must first model the valuation of a mortgage. 1 These will be standard amortizing fixed-rate mortgages, subject to both prepayment and default risk. The relevant economic environment is captured in the stochastic house price process, H(t), together with the spot interest rate process, r(t), determining the term structure. In conventional fashion, this study assumes that the house price H(t) follows a log-normal process (Merton, 1973) ,
where, in the first term, a is the total expected rate of return and s is the service flow component. In the second, stochastic term H z is to represent a white noise process, so that H T controls the volatility of the house price's rate of growth.
In a fashion as conventional as the treatment of house prices, let the term structure be generated by a spot rate r(t), which follows the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) process,
Here, R is the steady-state interest rate, while g is the coefficient of reversion of r(t) toward R . In analogy with the house prices, r z represents another white noise process, one driving the term structure, with r T then determining the resulting volatility in interest rates. Although the two processes r z and H z may be correlated in principle, in this study this correlation will always be taken to be zero.
The cost of a mortgage, V (r,H,t) , may be broken into the sum of the amortizing loan's value, A(r,t); the expected insurance premia payments, B(r,H,t); a call option, C (r,H,t) to prepay; and a default put option, D (r,H,t) ; so that
V(r, H, t) = A(r, t) + B(r, H, t) C(r, H, t) D(r, H, t).
(3) Each of these asset values, X(r,H,t), as well as insurance 's value, I(r,H,t) , is found by solving the valuation equation
with the distinction between the various assets reflected in the boundary conditions to this partial differential equation, needed to entirely specify a particular problem.
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Thus, one solves back from the termination of the loan, when the assets' values are assumed known, but making a transition once a month, when both a mortgage payment M and an insurance premium R must be paid, and so a default might occur. In terms of the value of the mortgage V + (r,H,t) immediately after payment, the condition for default is
in which case the insurance pays out
where U(t) is the unpaid principal and G is a limit to liability, usually taken to be 25 percent of the unpaid principal. In addition to this possibility of default, which may rationally occur only when a payment is due, there is the continual possibility of prepayment, which occurs in a region of sufficiently high house prices and sufficiently low interest rates that a free boundary is formed between this region and that where the loan continues.
One remaining complication occurs because insurance is typically required only as long as the borrower's equity has not reached 20 percent of the property's original value. This creates a path-dependency problem, because whether insurance applies and a premium must be paid depends on whether the 20 percent threshold has been reached in the past. 3 This is handled by running two forms of the problem at all times, one with insurance currently alive and one without. Then, at each payment date, one substitutes into the earlier month's asset value under continuing insurance whichever of the two solutions for the later month applies to the particular combination of house price and interest rates being considered. Compared to a one-time upfront insurance payment, the value of the premia B paid over time creates an ever-so-slight incentive to prepay or default and so avoid the payments. Let D 1 be the future value of default, assuming insurance currently continues to be in effect, and so insurance premia continue to be paid, and let D 2 be the value of default with insurance not currently in effect (so that insurance premia are surely never again paid). At payment date i, in say state (r(i),H(i)), it is simple to check whether 20 percent equity has then currently been attained or not. In the latter case, the before-payment value 1 ( ) D i
should be set equal to 1 ( ) ,
is the already-calculated afterpayment value of default when insurance is assumed to continue, whereas in the former case, insurance premia clearly cease and 1 ( ) D i
should be set to 2 ( ) .
It is, of course, only the beginning value 1 ( (0), (0),0) D r H that is eventually of interest, but one must continue to keep track of D 2 through time, because it must be used in each subsequent payment period to adjust the value of the sought-for D 1 in instances in which equity goes over 20 percent at that payment date, given that this was assumed not to occur in the valuation of D 1 up to that time. Although all of this must be done to get an exact answer, the effect of the insurance payments B is of course small; the major effect is simply that insurance coverage will then typically apply only in the earlier years of the loan, before equity has built up, and so this tends to dampen the variation in house price over the time that insurance is in effect. 4 In the interests of realism, the model includes two additional features. First, exogenous "nonoptimal" termination has been introduced at the end of each month. This represents terminations that happen for reasons other than minimizing the market cost of the mortgage, such as occurs with an unassumable mortgage when changes in jobs, family composition, etc., cause homeowners to move. The model allows the exogenously imposed termination to take the form of a default when this is less costly than prepayment, but, of course, in the vast majority of cases, prepayment is chosen. The level of nonoptimal termination has been chosen small (1 percent per year) relative to usual PSA schedules, both because much of actually observed prepayment should already be explained by endogenous, "rational" prepayment and because the authors do not want the pattern of nonoptimal termination to interfere with the primary concern, the effect of endogenous default on insurance payouts. The second feature added to this model is transaction costs of termination, which are allowed to vary according to whether the termination is endogenously chosen within the model or exogenously imposed "nonoptimal" termination, and according to whether the termination takes the form of prepayment or default.
To extract not just values of insurance but distributions of payouts, this study must work not just with the valuation Equation (4), but also the corresponding expression describing the evolution of probabilities. Letting P(r,H,t) denote the probability that an insurance payout in a particular range will occur, one must solve the Kolmogorov backward equation (Friedman, 1975) 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 0.
Note that this solution procedure works with the true stochastic processes in Equations (1) and (2), rather than the artificial ones used in the celebrated procedure of risk-neutralization that yields Equation (4), and so the true mean rate of house growth (a -s) appears in Equation (7) instead of the risk-neutralized expression (r -s) in Equation (4). In addition, Equation (7) lacks a term like -rX because no discounting is required in probability calculations. As with the valuation equation, the above partial differential equation problem is closed by specifying boundary conditions. 5 These take the form of assigning a one to any termination yielding an insurance payout in the specified range and zeros otherwise. By solving such a problem repeatedly over a succession of ranges, one obtains the distribution of insurance payouts exhibited in this study.
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NUMERICAL RESULTS
Insurance Claims Over Time
The parameter choices that characterize the mortgage contract and economic environment of the authors' base case are fully set out in Figure 1 . The loan consists of a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage with a 90 percent loan-to-value ratio and a 9½ percent contract rate. The key features of the economic environment are the housing-price and interest-rate volatilities, both of which have been set at 10 percent.
In Figure 1 , the distribution of insurance claims for this base case is broken into those claims occurring in various subintervals of time. The characteristic pattern is a small bump, followed by a large one, followed by the start of a third large one. The smallest bump consists entirely of defaults due to exogenous "nonoptimal" termination, oc-curring at a time when the house price has fallen enough to eliminate the equity in the house, and so the default option is slightly in the money (H<U). Although this moderate fall would not ordinarily be enough to cause default, given the valuable opportunity to reconsider later if one doesn't now default, an exogenous event has dictated that the homeowner is to move now, and so this otherwise valuable opportunity to later reconsider disappears. As will be seen in further figures, nonoptimal default is affected in a manner different from the main interest, the ordinary optimal default that makes up most of the remaining portion of the figure.
The prominent main bump in the graphs represents insurance payouts that have not reached their cap, whereas the rising portion at the end represents insurance payouts that have. The maximum claim for a 90 percent loan, ¼ × 90 = 22½ percent of the house's value, can occur only at the origin of the loan, although after only five years, the amount G U remains barely different from 22½ percent. However, after ten years, * The figures represent the distributions of insurance claims on various situations. For base values of the economic environment and the mortgage contract: the interest rate and house price volatilities are both 10 percent; the correlation coefficient between volatilities is 0; the expected return on the house is 11 percent; the service flow for the house is 8 percent; the initial spot interest rate is 8 percent; the steady-state spot interest rate is 10 percent; the reversion coefficient for the term structure is 25 percent; the nonoptimal prepayment is 50 percent PSA; the transaction costs for the optimal and nonoptimal default are 6 percent and 5 percent, respectively; and the transaction costs for optimal and nonoptimal prepayment are 3 percent and 2 percent, respectively. The base values for the mortgage contract are: a 30-year term to maturity, a contract rate of 9.5 percent, and a loan-to-value ratio of 90 percent. In the figures, the probabilities indicated at, say, a loss level of .12 represent the probability that a default will occur with a magnitude of insurance payouts within the succeeding interval (12 to 13.5 percent of the original house value). the change is significant enough that the lowest of the graphs, covering the last 20 years of the loan, cuts off noticeably before the others. Also note how few of the insurance payouts that ever occur take place over this last, large span of time. Partly, this is because the house has likely grown enough in value that insurance has ceased to be required of the mortgage, but another prime reason is that the mortgage will likely have been terminated well before then, probably in the form of a prepayment, eliminating the possibility of a later insurance payout on that particular mortgage. Finally, note that there is some tendency for the mode uncapped insurance claim to go down over time. This is because the future value of termination, C + D, will be less with less time to maturity, so that the condition for default, ( 
FIGURE 1*
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Changes in the Mortgage Contract
Changes in the Loan-to-Value Ratio. Figure 2 exhibits the relationship undoubtedly of greatest interest to insurers-how the distribution of insurance payouts is affected by the loan-to-value ratio. The first small bump again arises from exogenously induced nonoptimal default. The value of delay, together with transaction costs, ensures that no optimal default occurs in this interval, whereas a 3 percent higher transaction cost of nonoptimal default than of nonoptimal prepayment ensures that no default at all occurs in the first 3 percent interval.
FIGURE 2
The Distribution of Insurance Claims for Different Loan-to-Ratios Not surprisingly, the incidence of insurance payouts increases uniformly with increases in the loan-to-value ratio, across all payout levels. In addition, the mode uncapped insurance claim, U -H, also goes up with such increases in the loan-to-value. One can consider a change from, say, an 85 percent to a 90 percent loan-to-value ratio as beginning in (r,H,t) space at (r(0), (85/90)H(0),0) rather than at (r(0),H(0),0), but with all monetary values associated with the state space then scaled up by the same factor, 90/85. This latter scaling does not change the appearance of the prepayment and default boundaries at all, so if it were just for it, the insurance-claim distribution would just have shifted to the right by this factor. However, because the starting point in (r,H,t) space has also been moved closer to the unchanged default boundary, the shift is actually somewhat more. Indeed, the boundary will tend to be struck earlier in time, when the future value of termination is higher and, hence, so must be the immediate payoff to default, (A+B) -H, and thus the uncapped insurance claim, U -H.
Finally, note that the region of capped payments ends at f times the original loan-tovalue ratio and that this upper bound therefore also grows with the loan-to-value ratio.
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Changes in the Contract Rate. Figure 3 exhibits the effects of changes in the contract rate. Not surprisingly, a higher contract rate encourages more and earlier default. The only way to have earlier default is to have higher critical house values and, hence, lower values of the uncapped insurance claim, U -H, as indicated in the figure. In the case of increases in the loan-to-value ratio, the authors' reasoning was that, because the future value of termination would rise, so must the critical value of immediate default (A+B) -H and hence U -H. The reason that this same logic does not apply in the present case is that, whereas the loan-to-value ratio affects A and U together in the same proportion, so that (A+B) -H and U -H move together, changes in the contract rate affect A without affecting U, so that, here, (A+B) -H and U -H can, and do, move oppositely.
Notice that the movement in likelihood of claims due to nonoptimal default is contrary to that induced by ordinary optimal default. At higher contract rates, optimal termination occurs more rapidly, making it less likely that nonoptimal termination will ever occur.
Changes in the Economic Environment
Changes in the Volatilities
House-Price Volatility. The dramatic effect of house-price volatilities on default and, hence, insurance claims, shown in Figure 4 , is to be expected. The rise in house-price volatility drives up the future value of default and, thus, the critical immediate payoff, (A+B) -H. Because A is unaffected by house-price volatility, this takes the form of
FIGURE 3
The Distribution of Insurance Claims for Different Contract Rates FIGURE 4* The Distribution of Insurance Claims for Different House-Price Volatilities * For presentation, the interval 0.21-0.225 with a 7.82 probability was eliminated from the 15 percent volatility graph. a lower critical house price and, hence, higher insurance payout, U -H. With a houseprice volatility as high as 15 percent, the typical insurance payout would exceed 25 percent of the unpaid principal, so that instead, the cap binds, with the incidence of insurance claims ever-increasing up to the cap.
Interest-Rate Volatility. As shown in Figure 5 , the effects of changes in the interestrate volatility are not so dramatic as those of the house-price volatility, working in a more subtle fashion. The direct effect of increased interest-rate volatility is more on prepayment than on default, but, of course, prepayment serves as a substitute for default, and so the incidence of default falls. Although the effect of increased interestrate volatility on the incidence of insurers' payouts is opposite to the effect of increased contract rates, the two effects are similar in terms of the magnitude of a typical payout. Higher interest-rate volatilities increase the future value of termination and, hence, the critical immediate value of default, (A+B) -H, raising both A and H. However, although interest-rate volatilities affect A through the well-known Jensen's inequality, they have no direct effect on the unpaid principal, U, and so the insurance claim, U -H, typically falls.
FIGURE 5 The Distribution of Insurance Claims for Different Interest Rate Volatilities
Note that as well as being smaller and shifted to the left, the insurance-claim distribution at higher interest-rate volatilities is also more spread out. This is an obvious effect of increased variability in a stochastic environment and means that, although the cap on insurance payments is seldom reached at interest-rate volatilities as low as 5 percent, the 10 and 15 percent distributions have spread out enough to cause significant piling up against their caps.
Changes in the Service Flow and Expected Return to the Housing Asset. Figure 6 presents changes in the service flow, s, and the expected rate of return, a, that make up the trend portion of house-price movements. Exhibited is a movement from the base case of a = 11 percent and s = 8 percent to the alternative case of a lower service flow, s = 5 percent. In addition, the case in which a = 8 percent and s = 5 percent is included. In terms of valuations-the value of default, the value of insurance, etc.-there is no difference between these last two cases, because they both have the same service flows, and a does not affect valuation. However, their distributions of insurance claims are obviously different, which dramatically illustrates the central theme of this study-that one needs to look beyond simple valuation to determine what is of interest to insurers, although this can be done with the tools used in ordinary valuation.
FIGURE 6
The Distribution of Insurance Claims for Different Expected Rates of Return (alpha) and Service Flows(s) of the Housing Asset
One can think of the movement from a = 11 percent, s = 8 percent to a = 11 percent, s = 5 percent as first a movement to a = 8 percent, s = 5 percent, followed by a movement to a = 11 percent, s = 5 percent. The first movement then consists entirely of an alteration in the default boundary, because with both a and s lowered by 3 percent, the probability evolution Equation (7) remains entirely the same. Thus, the default boundary expands, so that the same distribution of (r,H) trajectories is more likely to hit it, but at higher H values and, so, smaller insurance claims, U -H. However, in the second movement, from a = 8 percent, s = 5 percent to a = 11 percent, s = 5 percent, the default boundary remains unaltered, but now the probability distribution of the (r,H) trajectories changes. The house tends to appreciate more rapidly and so is much less likely to ever fall enough in price to trigger a default. Although an insurance claim is considerably less likely, the magnitude of such a claim is little changed. 
Removal of Features of the Contract
The final figure illustrates some of the features of the model by examining the effect of their removal. In particular, transaction costs, exogenous termination, and, finally, both endogenous prepayment and exogenous termination are alternatively removed.
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FIGURE 7
The Distribution of Insurance Claims for No Transaction Costs, No PSA, and No Prepayment or PSA
The effect of no transaction costs is to increase the incidence of default, with default typically occurring after smaller falls in house prices and, hence, involving fewer insurance claims. Although the transaction costs of prepayment have also been removed, originally assuming a higher cost of default than of prepayment means that, in the absence of transaction costs, the substitution is away from prepayment into default.
The effect of removing exogenous termination is, of course, to eliminate the first small bump, but also observe that the claim distribution is affected everywhere, at least to some degree, even at high payout levels, where there is no possibility that the default was directly triggered by nonoptimal default. The actions taken in this model are those of foresighted individuals, and the change in any parameter will change such individuals' projections of what might happen and, hence, cause at least some small changes in how they act, even far from the event actually occurring. 8 The reason the authors did not remove endogenous prepayment alone is that exogenous termination itself mostly consists of prepayment, and it seemed artificial to remove rational prepayment but continue to allow "nonoptimal" exogenous prepayment. Note, however, that since the authors do not regard rational and "nonoptimal" prepayment as symmetric, they find nothing artificial in removing exogenous termination but keeping rational prepayment.
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. Finally, the effect of removing endogenous prepayment and exogenous termination is rather obviously to greatly encourage default, both because default is now the only means of terminating the mortgage and because prior prepayment no longer removes the possibility of later default. What is more, in the absence of this valuable right to prepay, the 9½ contract rate becomes excessive and so, to an extent, this, too, encourages default.
CONCLUSION
Insurers have not traditionally differentiated prices among different homeowners policies nearly as much as rational pricing or, indeed, even common sense would seem to demand. To the extent that this is explained by an unfamiliarity with the effects of the differing factors influencing a mortgage or an inability to calculate the effects of such factors, option-pricing techniques should increase insurers' ability to make such distinctions. If, in addition, insurers do not fully diversify through reinsurance markets, then this indicates a yet greater need to distinguish among different insurance policies, even those that ideally would have the same market value. As this study has demonstrated, option-pricing techniques continue to provide the means of assessing not just the fair market value of an insurance contract, but also the distribution of all possible claims and the effect on these claims of any factor that might directly or even indirectly influence the default decision.
